both are there and capable of being excited and cultivated. It is not that moral principle is universally submitted to, for, in fact, it is universally rejected, but still it is in all men—when it serves no other end—as a law to condemn them, so that "they are without excuse."

Should any party insist on our resolving this intuitive principle, we remind him, that in doing so we could only be reducing it to a farther principle, and that he might, on the same ground, ask us to resolve that law also, and, as he thus pushed us, we must at length be carried back to a principle which could not be reduced to anything simpler, and which we must therefore just assume. Now, we assert at once, that it is by an original principle that the mind decides, when voluntary acts pass under its notice, that they are right, or that they are wrong. It seems evident to us, on the one hand, that it cannot be resolved into any of those intellectual axioms on which the understanding proceeds in acquiring knowledge. Compound and decompound these as we please, they never will lead to the idea of right and wrong. "Nor, on the other hand, can it be reduced to those principles which are connected with the desire of pleasure, or the aversion to pain. No composition of such ideas or feelings could produce the idea or feeling expressed in the words "ought," "duty," "moral obligation," "desert," "guilt." As well, in our view, might we talk of a combination of gases, or of any other corporeal substance, producing an idea, as of mere intellectual ideas, or mere emotions connected with the sensations of pleasure and pain, producing a sense of moral obligation. Even as no composition of colours can produce sound, and no composition of odours produce colours, so, as it appears to us, no possible combination of intellectual conceptions, or sensations of pleasure and pain, or of the desires connected with these, can produce moral approbation and disapprobation.

We are thus brought to the conclusion, that the mind declares that there is an indelible distinction between good and evil: just as it declares that there is an indelible distinction between truth and error. We believe that the mind, in the one case as in the other, proceeds on its own fundamental principles. Does some one insist on our making this moral idea patent to the intellect, and justifying it to the understanding? We reply, that the distinction does not come under the cognizance of the under-